"Precautionary Saving under LiquidityConstraints: Evidence from Rural Pakistan" by Jeong-Joon Lee & Yasuyuki Sawada
CIRJE Discussion Papers can be downloaded without charge from:
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html
Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. They are not intended for
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author. For that reason Discussion Papers may
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author.
CIRJE-F-377
Precautionary Saving under Liquidity





September 2005Precautionary Saving under Liquidity









This paper investigates precautionary saving under liquidity constraints
in Pakistan using household panel data. In particular, while we estimates
Kimball’s (1990) prudence parameter, we deviate from Dynan’s (1993)
framework by explicitly considering liquidity constraints, as in Zeldes
(1989). By doing so, we attempt to diﬀerentiate the standard precaution-
ary saving caused by uncertainty from the one due to liquidity constraints.
Furthermore, endogenous liquidity constraints are considered to resolve is-
sues of selection biases. In this study, we document substantial evidence
of the presence of precautionary saving in Pakistan. More speciﬁcally, the
estimated prudence is signiﬁcantly higher for liquidity-constrained house-
holds as compared with unconstrained ones. The results support the
emerging view that facilitating saving may often be more important than
ﬁnding better ways of lending to the poor.
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11 Introduction
People in developing countries, especially the poor, face a wide variety of in-
come shocks. The existing studies address the eﬀectiveness of self, mutual, or
market insurances against income shocks such as precautionary saving, credit
market transactions, labor market participation, and mutual transfers [Besley
(1995); Dercon ed. (2005); Fafchamps (2003); Kochar (1999); Morduch (1995);
Rosenzweig (2001); Townsend (1994); and Udry (1994)].1
The purpose of our study is to empirically examine the relationship between
liquidity constraints and precautionary saving using the household panel data
from rural Pakistan. In order to achieve this, Kimball’s (1990, henceforth Kim-
ball) concept of prudence is estimated primarily based on the framework studied
by Dynan (1993, henceforth Dynan). This study diﬀers from previous work in
that it integrates Dynan’s approach with Zeldes’ (1989, henceforth Zeldes) liq-
uidity constraint model, which is extended by endogenous liquidity constraints.
We document substantial evidence with regard to the existence of precautionary
saving in Pakistan. Furthermore, the ﬁndings suggest that the levels of esti-
mated prudence appear to be associated with the levels of wealth: While poor,
liquidity-constrained households behave prudently, rich, un-constrained ones do
not exhibit precautionary saving motives. The ﬁndings could have signiﬁcant
implications on the role of precautionary saving in developing countries.2
In particular, this paper attempts to contribute to the research on this sub-
1When facing a negative income shock, a household can utilize credit market transactions
to smooth consumption by reallocating future resources for present use [Eswaran and Kotwal
(1989); Besley (1995)]. Yet, there is a plenty of evidence that poor households have only
limited access to the credit market and are therefore constrained from borrowing [Morduch
(1990), Pender (1996)]. Since households are aware that liquidity constraints are binding,
they will attempt to insure themselves by accumulating precautionary saving. Then, in the
event of unexpected negative shocks, the households utilize their own ﬁnancial and physical
assets that have been previously accumulated [Deaton (1991)].
2The importance of precautionary saving in general has been well documented. For an
example on aggregate consumption, see Gourinchas and Parker (2001). For a survey based
on micro data, see Browning and Lusardi (1996).
2ject in three ways. First, multiple risk-coping strategies are considered. Most of
the existing studies on risk and household behavior in developing countries have
not permitted the simultaneous employment of diﬀerent risk-coping strategies by
households [Rosenzweig (2001)]. It would be merely misleading to consider any
single method of risk-coping in isolation [Alderman and Paxson (1992, p.2)].
This paper aims to particularly bridge this gap in the existing literature by
considering both the precautionary saving and liquidity constraints within an
integrated framework.3
Second, this paper investigates the empirical relationship between precau-
tionary saving and liquidity constraints. Based on numerical studies, Zeldes
(1984) showed that liquidity constraints could induce precautionary saving even
under the quadratic utility function. Carroll and Kimball (2001) also developed
a rigorous theory and a numerical analysis to explain the relationship between
precautionary saving and liquidity constraints.4 However, there has been lit-
tle consensus with regard to studies on this empirical relationship. In order
to bridge this gap in the literature, we estimate Kimball’s prudence parameter
for precautionary saving, based primarily on the consumption Euler equation
approach suggested by Dynan, and integrate it with Zeldes’ liquidity constraint
model.5 Furthermore, we follow Jappelli (1990); Jappelli, Pischeke, and Soule-
les (1998); and Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997) in order to consider endogenous
liquidity constraints for resolving issues of sample selection biases.
This type of empirical research is particularly important in the context of de-
3This type of study is also of practical importance since changes in the costs and beneﬁts
of one coping strategy aﬀect the manner in which other strategies are used, and thus, these
interactions among diﬀerent strategies may be important for a policy design. For example,
Cox and Jimenez (1990) have shown that public transfers crowded out altruistically-motivated
private transfers, mitigating the net eﬀectiveness of public interventions.
4See Samwick (2003) and Xu (1995) for other theoretical treatments.
5There exist a large number of discussions on the usefulness of the consumption Euler
estimation approach. See Attanasio and Low (2004), Carroll (2001), and Ludvigson and
Paxon (2001) for examples. In particular, Ludvigson and Paxon (2001) argued that Dynan’s
speciﬁcation was likely to produce a downward bias in the estimated prudence parameters.
3veloping countries. Poor households in developing countries are known to hold
signiﬁcant amounts of precautionary saving in a wide variety of forms such as
stored grain, cash holdings, jewelry, and livestock [Alderman (1996); Fafchamps,
Udry, and Czukas(1998); Park (2005); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993); and
Townsend (1995)]. Park (2005) argued that grain stocks were the most impor-
tant form of precautionary saving in developing countries despite their negative
returns. This is a strange situation wherein many impoverished people save
their precious resources, which later generate negative returns. This seemingly
awkward practice may be due to the lack of access to credit and/or reliable
saving opportunities.
Finally, this paper provides another reason for small estimates of the pru-
dence parameter in the U.S., based on the Dynan speciﬁcation.6 While existing
studies such as Chen and Zhou (2003) for China, Hori and Shimizutani (2005)
for Japan, Ludvigson and Paxon (2001) for the U.S., and Merrigan and Mor-
nandin (1996) for the U.K. provided several possible reasons, our study con-
siders a repeatedly investigated factor–the liquidity constraint. Some unique
information on liquidity constraints obtained from the Pakistan panel data set
permits a more precise empirical analysis of precautionary saving and liquid-
ity constraints as compared with that of the previous studies. In other words,
estimating the prudence parameter based on the Dynan speciﬁcation without
taking into account liquidity constraints may lead to an omitted variable bias if
a large portion of the sample is liquidity-constrained.
In summary, this study documents strong evidence in support of the exis-
tence of precautionary saving under liquidity constraints in Pakistan, charac-
terized by the sizable estimated prudence parameters. However, if the liquid-
ity constraint variables are not controlled, the estimated prudence gets signiﬁ-
6Dynan estimated the prudence parameters to be in the range of 0.02 and 0.3 and argued
that these values were too low to be consistent with the widely accepted beliefs about risk
aversion.
4cantly lowered, suggesting a possible omitted variable bias in Dynan’s speciﬁ-
cation. Moreover, prudence is substantially higher in the case of the liquidity-
constrained rather than unconstrained households. The results are robust even
when the endogeneity bias with regard to liquidity constraints is carefully elim-
inated. The precautionary saving motives are found to be stronger when house-
holds have limited access to credit markets, suggesting that the levels of esti-
mated prudence may be associated with levels of wealth. In other words, the
rich, having credit market access, display few precautionary saving motives.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Alderman (1996) who estimated saving
functions directly using the same data as ours; he found that the wealthiest
households saved their entire transitory income. Thus, the standard life cycle
permanent income hypothesis holds.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents
an integrated model of precautionary saving and liquidity constraints. Section
3 describes the Pakistan household panel data set and illustrates the estima-
tion results. The ﬁnal section summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses policy
implications.
2 The Model
2.1 Precautionary Saving and Liquidity Constraints
Following Dynan and Kimball, we quantify households’ precautionary saving




C is the consumption level.7 Moreover, we extend Dynan’s speciﬁcation by
explicitly considering possible liquidity constraints. Let A, y, and Z represent
household assets at the beginning of the period, exogenously given income,
7The non-negative third derivative of the utility function indicates that the marginal utility
is convex and when a consumer faces increases in uncertainty, the expected consumption
growth rises. Thus, the household increases saving and decreases consumption.
5and the credit ceiling, respectively. Following Zeldes, the liquidity constraints
A+y−C +Z ≥ 0 are introduced into the household problem, and, accordingly,




)Et[U0(Ct+1)] + λt, (1)
where r is the interest rate, δ is the subjective discount rate, and Et is the
conditional expectation operator. The last term on the right hand side, λ, is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint equation.
In Equation (1), the shadow value of the constraint λt for the un-constrained
households is zero, and the standard consumption Euler equation holds. How-
ever, with regard to the constrained households, the shadow cost of the liquidity
constraint is positive, i.e., λt > 0 and the household decreases its current con-
sumption. With a non-zero shadow cost of the liquidity constraint, this study
applies a second-order Taylor approximation of Et[U0(Ci,t+1)] around the point
















)2] + ˜ λi,t, (2)
where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, −
U
00Ci,t
U0 , ρ is the the coeﬃcient
of relative prudence, −
U
000Ci,t
U00 , and ˜ λt is − λt
Ci,tU00.
In order to derive an estimable model based on Equation (2), we follow
Merrigan and Normandin (1996) and replace the expected consumption growth




= β0 + β1(
Ci,t+1 − Ci,t
Ci,t
)2 + ˜ λi,t + ηi,t+1, (3)
6where β0 = 1
σ(r−δ
1+r) and β1 =
ρ
2. In Equation (3), β1 captures a half of the coeﬃ-
cient of relative prudence under liquidity constraints. Equation (3) is our econo-
metric model to be estimated. In Equation (3), the error term ηi has a mean of
zero, but it might be correlated with (
Ci,t+1−Ci,t
Ci,t )2. Thus, this study employs
the instrumental variable (IV ) regressions to estimate the model. Moreover,
it is unlikely that the error term η is independent and identically distributed
for the following three reasons: there might exist measurement errors, changes
in tastes may not be independent and identically distributed, and expectations
errors may diﬀer across families. Hence, we control for heterogeneity and aggre-
gate shocks by including age dummies and district dummies in the estimated
equation.8
The manner in which the Lagrange multiplier term for liquidity constraints
should be treated is a remaining issue. The conventional empirical approach
such as Zeldes (1989) employs the divided sample into two groups based on
income and asset information: those likely to be liquidity-constrained (˜ λi,t ≥ 0)
and those not likely to be liquidity-constrained (˜ λi,t = 0).9 It is straightforward
to show that the Lagrange multiplier ˜ λ is a negative function of the household’s
income Yi,t. Therefore, we follow Zeldes and use the household income as a proxy
for the shadow value of the liquidity constraint by assuming that ˜ λi,t = β2Yi,t,
where β2 < 0 for constrained households and zero for un-constrained households.
Among other things, the data set used in our study contains a unique piece
of information regarding liquidity constrained households, which will help us
clearly identify the constrained and the un-constrained groups. We then esti-
mate the model with diﬀerent prudence and income coeﬃcients, i.e., β1 and β2,
for these two groups of households.
8The data set contains data from four mutually-distant districts. We assume that each
district has diﬀerent aggregate shocks, such as weather shocks.
9See Zeldes for details.
72.2 Endogenous Liquidity Constraints
The above exogenous sample split approach assumes that the liquidity con-
straint is exogenously given. However, the Euler equation (2) indicates that
the liquidity constraint is endogenously determined; thus we also consider en-
dogeneity of liquidity constraints following Garcia, et al. (1997). According
to them, the availability of credit may depend not only on economic variables
but also on socio-economic values due to collateral requirements and standard
information-economics reasons. Thus, they argued that it would be better to
use multiple factors while determining the liquidity-constrained groups.
Assume that C∗ and C represent the optimal consumption in the absence of
a liquidity constraint and the actually chosen consumption level, respectively.
C∗ = C if the liquidity constraint is not binding, while C∗ > C if the liquidity
constraint is binding. We can then deﬁne the gap, H, between C∗ and C∗:
Hi,t = C∗
i,t − Ci,t. (4)
Following Hayashi (1985) and Jappelli (1990), this study assumes that the
conditional expectation of desired consumption C∗ can be approximated by a
quadratic function of observable cross-sectional variables such as the current
income, wealth, age of the household head, and household size. Assuming that
the credit ceiling Z can also be a function of the same variables, we can represent
H by a reduced form function:
Hi,t = Wi,tβW + υi,t, (5)
where βW is the column vector of the coeﬃcients of diﬀerent variables used to
determine liquidity constraints.
In order to estimate augmented Euler Equation (3), this study combines
8it with the endogenous liquidity constraint a la Japelli (1990). If superscripts
u and c denote the unconstrained and constrained groups, respectively, the
estimable Euler equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Ci,t+1 − Ci,t
Ci,t
















1 if Hi,t > 0
0 if Hi,t ≤ 0,
Hi,t = Wi,tβW + κi,t, (7)
where δ is a dummy variable for the liquidity-constraint equation, which takes
the value of one if the equation is binding, and zero, otherwise.
In order to estimate the system of Equations (6) and (7), this study applies
Amemiya (1985)’s Type 5 Tobit model with observed regimes. We assume that
errors ηi and κi in Equations (6) and (7), respectively, follow a bivariate normal
distribution with zero means, a constant covariance σηκ, and constant variances.
The Type 5 Tobit model explicitly considers the endogenous sample selection
bias arising from endogenous liquidity constraints. This study estimates the
Type 5 Tobit model of Equations (6) and (7) using the Heckman’s two-step
procedure. In the ﬁrst step, Equation (7) is estimated by a probit model. Then,
based on the estimated coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst step, this study can obtain a
consistent estimate of the sample selection correction term in the conditional
expectation of the error term of Equation (6). Subsequently, unbiased coef-
ﬁcients in Equation (6) and the corrected variance–covariance matrix can be
estimated.10
10We also tried to consistently estimate the parameters in the Euler and liquidity-
constrained equations by maximizing the log-likelihood function. Yet, we failed to achieve
a convergence in the likelihood function. Therefore, we employed a two-step estimation pro-
9The other issue that we consider here is an endogeneity bias arising from a
correlation between the error term ηi and (
Ci,t+1−Ci,t
Ci,t )2. In order to cope with
this issue, this study postulates the following linear equation for the squared
consumption growth: (
Ci,t+1−Ci,t
Ci,t )2 = Xi,tβX + ui,t. Assuming that ui and ηi
follow a bivariate normal distribution, we can employ the Smith and Blundell
(1986) method to cope with the endogeneity bias by using the following equation
instead of Equation (6):
Ci,t+1 − Ci,t
Ci,t











2(1 − δi,t)Yi,t + αui,t+1 + ηi,t+1. (8)
When Equation (8) is estimated along with Equation (7), the error term u is re-




3 Data and Estimation Results
3.1 IFPRI data
This study uses the multi-purpose household panel data pertaining to rural Pak-
istan obtained through the Pakistan Food Security Management Project of the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) [Alderman (1996); Alder-
man and Garcia (1993)]. The IFPRI panel data set was collected by 14 rounds
of survey over six years from 1986 (kharif: monsoon wheat season) to 1991 (rabi:
winter season).11 A total of approximately 1000 households were included in
the initial survey. The surveys were conducted in three of the less developed
cedure here.
11The second author conducted follow-up surveys in 1997 and 1998 and found signiﬁcant
precautionary saving in the form of grain stock.
10districts: the Attock district in the Province of Punjab, the Badin district in
the Province of Sind, and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)’s Dir dis-
trict. A relatively well-developed and irrigated area, the Faisalabad district
in the Province of Punjab, was also included in the survey for the purpose of
comparison [Alderman and Garcia (1993)].
The data set contains rich information regarding various economic environ-
ments and the decisions of the poor households in the semi-arid tropical areas
with regard to income and expenditures as well as education, landownings, and
employment. In particular, it contains valuable direct information on credit
market accessibility, which allows us to distinguish the liquidity-constrained
households from liquidity un-constrained households. During the credit mod-
ule of the survey, the enumerators questioned the respondents not having loans
regarding the primary and secondary reasons for not availing of the diﬀerent
types of formal loans. The answer choices were: (a) Do not need credit, (b)
Do not know how to borrow, (c) No easy access, (d) No collateral, (e) Fear
of bad debts, (f ) Loan application denied, (g) Easier to borrow from informal
sources, and (h) Defaults in past loans.12 The respondents who chose from op-
tions (b) - (h) of the above list for at least one type of credit were identiﬁed as
households most likely to be liquidity-constrained with regard to formal sources.
Yet, the remaining respondents were considered to be the un-constrained. The
respondents who chose option (g) from the list could possibly be un-constrained
because they may obtain suﬃcient credit from informal sources. We also con-
ducted the same analysis using a weaker constraint indicator variable, identify-
ing as the constrained group those who chose from options (b) — (f ) and (h).
The results with the weaker constraint variable, which are not shown in this
paper, are fully consistent with the results reported in this paper. Indeed, the
12Among the choices provided, (e) Fear of bad debts can represent the possibility of future
binding liquidity constraints.
11respondents who chose the option (g) from the list do not necessarily obtain
suﬃcient credit from informal sources. This is the reason why we have decided
to pursue the strict liquidity constraint indicator, using responses of (b) — (h)
from the list as evidence of liquidity constraints.13
On the basis of these responses, we can identify the liquidity-constrained
households who were not able to access credit. Since almost none of the existing
multi-purpose household panel surveys include direct questions that identify
liquidity constraints (Scott, 2000), the IFPRI data set provides us with valuable
information directly to separate the eﬀects of liquidity constraints from those of
precautionary saving.14
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the 672 households used in this
study. Among them, 573 households are identiﬁed to be liquidity-constrained
and 98 to be un-constrained, indicating that a majority of households of rural
Pakistan are liquidity-constrained.15 Through out the sample, the head of a
household is, on average, 44.5 years old and has approximately 2.1 years of
schooling. The average income of the households is 29,057 Rupees ($1,674.75 in
1986/87 price) and the average expenditure is 20,616.57 Rupees ($1,188.27 in
1986/87 price).16 Thus, their average propensity to consume is 0.71. Further,
an average household owns 18,304 Rupees ($1,054.98 in 1986/87 price) worth
of livestock and approximately 9.47 acres of land.
While the age proﬁles of the constrained and un-constrained households are
similar, the other characteristics of the two groups are remarkably diﬀerent.
The members of the constrained households are, on average, less educated and
poorer than those of the un-constrained households. The constrained house-
13The results based on the weaker constraints are available upon request from the corre-
sponding author.
14However, the credit module with information relevant to this study is included only during
the initial year (round six); thus, we utilize data from the ﬁrst two years only.
15This study considers households whose heads are over 16 years and less than 65 years of
age.
16Pakistan had a ﬁxed exchange rate system in 1986–87. $1.00 = 17.35 Rupees
12holds have approximately 1.9 years of schooling, in comparison with the un-
constrained households that have slightly more than three years of schooling.
More importantly, the average annual income and the average consumption of
the constrained households are 25,475 Rupees ($1,468.29) and 19,935 Rupees
($1,148.99), respectively. Thus, their average propensity to consume is 0.78.
On the other hand, the un-constrained households have less than 0.5 of an av-
erage propensity to consume. It is evident that the average income for the
un-constrained households is close to 50,000 Rupees ($2,881.84), which is al-
most twice the income level of the constrained households. In addition, the
un-constrained households own larger areas of land and more livestock than the
constrained ones.
In summary, the descriptive statistics conﬁrm the documented stylized fact
of poor households in developing countries: More than 85% of the households in
the sample are liquidity-constrained. Therefore, empirical investigations on pre-
cautionary saving motives based on the Pakistani household data set could shed
light on the importance of complementarity and substitutability with respect to
precautionary saving and liquidity constraints.
3.2 Estimation Results
Tables 2–6 show the estimation results for the various speciﬁcations considered
in this study. As discussed in the previous section, it should be noted that the
consumption growth is not an exogenous variable. Thus, we choose education
variables, occupation dummies, the numbers of earners in the household, and
the value of assets as instruments.17 First, Table 2 presents the summary of the
estimation results for four speciﬁcations, which are the same as those of Dynan.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 2 present the results without including district
17This study closely follows Dynan with respect to selecting a set of instruments. With
respect to asset holdings, we consider livestock and land ownership, where livestock and land
data were collected in the middle and the beginning of the ﬁrst year, respectively.
13dummies, and the next four columns display the results with district dummies.
There are four districts in the data set and the district dummy variables are
able to capture aggregate risks.18 Since the overall uncertainty could aﬀect the
level of prudence, we control for aggregate risks by including district dummies.
Also, age dummies are included in all the speciﬁcations in order to control for
life cycle eﬀects.
The R2s for the ﬁrst-stage regressions range from 0.056 to 0.079, implying
that the instruments explain only a small portion of the variability of consump-
tion. Yet, this is similar to the previous studies, including the one conducted
by Dynan. While we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the
instruments are equal to zero in the ﬁrst stage (Table 2), the overall results of
the over-identiﬁcation tests in Tables 2, 3, and 4 assure the validity of these
instruments. The exceptions are speciﬁcations (1), (2), and (3) in Table 2.
On the other hand, the second-stage estimation results reveal that risk af-
fects consumption growth positively. In the absence of the district dummies,
the implied prudence parameters range between 0.104 and 3.562. Among the
four diﬀerent cases, the results from the ﬁrst IV regressions (1) in Table 2 show
that the implied prudence parameter is 1.550, rejecting the hypothesis that the
coeﬃcient of relative prudence is zero. It is evident that the implied prudence
is substantially greater than the U.S. estimate reported by Dynan for speciﬁ-
cations (1) and (2). On the other hand, the estimated prudence parameters in
speciﬁcations (3) and (4) are similar to Dynan’s estimates.
In Table 2, the implied prudence parameters in the speciﬁcations with dis-
trict dummies are greater than the ones without district dummies. The results
from the model with district dummies suggest that precautionary saving motives
become stronger once aggregate risks are taken into account.
This study continues to investigate the precautionary saving motives by in-
18The district dummy variables could also capture the supply aspects of the credit markets.
14tegrating the framework presented by Dynan with Zeldes’ model of liquidity
constraints. Table 3 summarizes the results with income as an additional in-
dependent variable for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the liquidity
constraint. With respect to the full set of instruments, the estimated prudence
parameter is found to be 2.140, which is statistically signiﬁcant [speciﬁcation
(1)]. More importantly, the coeﬃcient on income is found to be negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the model of liquidity-constrained
households. In Table 3, the overall negative sign of the coeﬃcient on income
suggests that the consumption Euler equation does not hold for Pakistani house-
holds in general and the shadow value of liquidity constraints is positive. Indeed,
it could be a reﬂection of the fact that more than 85% the households in the
sample are liquidity-constrained. Among other things, Table 3 reveals that the
speciﬁcation suggested by Dynan could suﬀer from omitted variable biases if
applied to developing countries, wherein most of the households are liquidity-
constrained. When the results of Table 3 are directly compared with those of
Table 2, the estimated prudence parameters are found to be uniformly larger
except the speciﬁcation (2).19
This study further examines precautionary saving under liquidity constraints
by looking at two separate groups of households on the basis of the direct re-
sponses that each household provided in the survey. The results from the two
split samples provide even stronger evidence for precautionary saving in Pak-
istan: Table 4 shows that for all four sets of instruments, the estimated prudence
parameters for the constrained households are positive and the coeﬃcients on
income are negative. These prudence parameters are uniformly larger than the
previous estimates in Tables 2 and 3. They are, indeed, all statistically sig-
19Theoretically speaking, this omitted variable bias occurs when the consumption growth
squared term and the income variable are negatively correlated. This situation is likely to
happen when the rich engage in riskier income-generating activities than the poor.
15niﬁcant, suggesting a violation of the standard consumption Euler equation.20
On the other hand, for the un-constrained households, we fail to reject the
hypothesis that the estimated prudence parameters and the shadow value of
liquidity constraints are all equal to zero. This is consistent with the standard
consumption Euler equation.
A comparison between the implied prudence levels of the constrained group
using the full set of instruments, i.e., speciﬁcation (1) in Table 4 and the one
using the same set of instrument in Table 3 reveals that the overall prudence level
estimated before the two groups were split could underestimate the importance
of precautionary saving of the constrained group. The implied prudence levels of
the former and latter groups are 2.578 and 2.140, respectively. As we discussed
brieﬂy, since a majority of poor households tend to be liquidity-constrained in
Pakistan, they appear to behave very prudently.
A question arises with regard to the other implications that these results
have. While this study does not have suﬃcient data to track the entire life-
cycle consumption-saving behavior of each household, the pattern that emerges
from Tables 1 and 4 indicates that a low level of prudence is associated with
a high level of wealth. In other words, prudence decreases with an increase in
wealth. These observed diﬀerences in the prudence levels of the two groups of
households could be evidence of the decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA)
or the decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), which is theoretically studied
by Kimball.21 Moreover, our interpretation is consistent with that of Ogaki and
Zhang (2001) who found evidence in support of the DRRA utility by using the
same IFPRI Pakistan data.
Finally, this study employs the use of switching regressions to investigate
20The levels of signiﬁcance vary depending on instruments.
21If the risk premium associated with any risk is a decreasing function of wealth, then
preferences exhibit DARA. Furthermore, DARA requires U000 > 0, which implies prudence.
DRRA is a very close concept and is stronger than DARA. See Kimball for details.
16possible sample selection biases arising from endogenous liquidity constraints
(Tables 5–6). Table 5 displays the ﬁrst stage Probit estimation for the purpose
of determining liquidity-constrained households. The results presented in Table
5 indicate that a higher income level leads to less binding liquidity constraints.
Table 6 presents estimation results for switching regressions, in which we fail
to reject the hypothesis that the sample selection correction term is zero for
all four speciﬁcations. In addition, the Smith and Blundell adjustment term is
found to be statistically insigniﬁcant.22 While the estimated sign of prudence is
consistent with the theory’s prediction, the size of the implied prudence becomes
slightly smaller for the constrained households in comparison to the one in Table
4: The estimated prudence is found to be 1.871 for the constrained and 0.942 for
the un-constrained households. Lastly, although the coeﬃcients on income are
negative for both the constrained and the un-constrained households, they are
not statistically signiﬁcant. The overall results imply that while, in principle,
endogenous liquidity constraints are important and could cause biases in the
estimated parameters; our speciﬁcations in Table 4 may not suﬀer from the
sample selection problem. Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Garcia,
et al. (1997): it is unlikely that households self-select whether they wish to
be liquidity-constrained. Thus, potential sample selection problems caused by
endogenous liquidity constraints do not appear to be severe.
4 Concluding Remarks
In summary, this study’s empirical investigations provide three main results.
First, we document strong evidence of the presence of precautionary saving in
Pakistan, especially with respect to the liquidity-constrained households, the es-
22When the full set of instruments (1) is used, the estimated covariance term is found to be
-0.066 and the Smith and Blundell adjustment term is -0.058 for the constrained households.
However, both the terms are not statistically signiﬁcant even at the 10% level of signiﬁcance.
17timated prudence parameters of which fall within the range of 1.7—4.0. On the
other hand, ﬁnancially better-oﬀ households appear to have perfect credit mar-
ket access [Morduch (1995)]. These results, based on the estimated prudence
parameters, are rather robust even with various speciﬁcations and diﬀerent sets
of instruments. In fact, based on simulations, Ludvision and Paxon (2001) ar-
gued that the degree of bias in Dynan’s speciﬁcation varied with wealth, with
less wealthy households displaying greater downward bias. Thus, the implied
prudence of the constrained households in this study could be even larger than
reported. Second, on the basis of the fact that un-constrained households are
richer, our results can be used as empirical evidence of DRRA (and DARA)
studied by Kimball. Although it is found that the liquidity-constrained house-
holds have precautionary saving motives, Table 1 shows that their actual average
propensity to save is much smaller than that of the un-constrained households.
Thus, it may be diﬃcult for them to accumulate assets over their life cycle.
This may be one of the reasons why the constrained households end up owning
small assets. Finally, the results of this study suggest that precautionary sav-
ing becomes stronger under liquidity constraints. The existing theoretical and
numerical studies demonstrate that the possibility of future binding constraints
makes the household accumulate buﬀer stock [Samwick (2003); Caroll and Kim-
ball (2001); and Xu (1995)]. In this line of research, the presence of liquidity
constraints in the standard life cycle model with uncertainty would increase fu-
ture income risks. Thus, the liquidity constraints strengthen the precautionary
saving motives for households. Our results provide an empirical validity to these
claims because this study ﬁnds that broadly-deﬁned liquidity constraints cause
the households to behave prudently. In other words, the results reveal an em-
pirical complementarity between precautionary saving and liquidity constraints.
The ﬁndings reported in this study imply that the liquidity-constrained poor
18would be willing to hold assets even with low or negative returns because they
have a desire to set up a buﬀer stock. This may appear as perverse behavior
at ﬁrst sight; however, it is indeed a rational response given their environmen-
tal constraints. The ﬁndings question the commonly-held assumptions among
researchers that borrowing constraints are far more serious than savings con-
straints. The combination of the two would generate more serious welfare con-
sequences on the poor than the liquidity constraints alone. From a practical
viewpoint, this study supports the emerging view among microﬁnance practi-
tioners and policy makers that facilitating saving may often be more important
than ﬁnding better ways to lend to low-income customers, and particularly to
the most impoverished households [Armend´ ariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005,
p. 172].
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24Table 1: Sample Statistics
All C Un-C
Variable Mean Mean Mean
Agea 44.53 44.43 44.95
(11.74) (11.83) (11.2)
Years of schoolinga 2.08 1.91 3.12
(3.93) (3.73) (4.82)
Consumptionb 20615.67 19935.47 24310.31
(in Rupees in 1986/87) (10546.74) (9839.234) (13196.8)
Incomeb 29057.3 25475.1 49955.45
(in Rupees in 1986/87) (35201.85) (21820.9) (72435.6)
Value of livestockb 18304.31 17532.92 22709.82
(in Rupees in 1986/87) (15014.62) (14543.33) (16887.99)
Landb 9.47 8.49 15.22
(Acres) (22.23) (20.07) (31.66)
Sample size 672 573 98
Standard deviations are in parentheses. C stands for Constrained households and Un-C for
Un-constrained households. a. represents the head and b. represents the households.
25Table 2: Basic Speciﬁcations
Without District Dummies With District Dummies
Instrumental Variable (IV) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Educationa 0.541 .. 0.590 0.548 0.646 .. 0.633 0.655
Occupationa 0.801 0.836 .. 0.803 0.888 0.883 .. 0.891
Earnersa 0.553 0.592 0.569 .. 0.292 0.308 0.298 ..
Livestocka 0.932 0.922 0.739 0.968 0.932 0.971 0.964 0.765
Landa 0.914 0.693 0.815 0.889 0.800 0.845 0.858 0.792
First − stage R2 0.068 0.056 0.055 0.068 0.079 0.068 0.068 0.077
(Con − Growth)2 0.775 1.781 0.232 0.485 0.981 1.909 0.783 0.521
(0.431)* (0.687)*** (0.665) (0.443) (0.431)** (0.688)*** (0.595) (0.455)
Prudence 1.550 3.562 0.464 0.970 1.962 3.818 1.566 1.042
(0.862)* (1.374)*** (1.33) (0.886) (0.862)** (1.376)*** (1.190) (0.910)
Over Idb 0.004 0.068 0.012 0.18 0.133 0.535 0.111 0.676
Standard errors are in parentheses. Age dummies (not reported here) are included to control for life cycle eﬀects. a. represents the P-values of
F-tests from the ﬁrst stage estimations and b. represents the over-identiﬁcation tests based on Sargan pseudo-F tests. *** 1% level; 5% level; 10%
level; 15# level
2
6Table 3: Speciﬁcations with Liquidity Constraints
IV (1) (2) (3) (4)
First − stage R2 0.083 0.074 0.071 0.079
(Con − Growth)2 1.070 1.651 0.943 0.598
(0.428)** (0.594)*** (0.597)# (0.456)
Implied 2.140 3.302 1.886 1.196
Prudence (0.865)** (1.188)*** (1.194)# (0.912)
Income -0.945 -1.074 -0.916 -0.839
(0.275)*** (0.314)*** (0.288)*** (0.277)***
Over Ida 0.253 0.427 0.912 0.661
Standard errors are in parentheses. IV (1) includes education, occupation, number of earners, and assets. IV (2) includes occupation, number of
earners, and assets. IV (3) includes education, number of earners, and assets. IV (4) includes education, occupation, and assets. Age dummies (not
reported here) are included to control for the life-cycle eﬀects. a. represents the over-identiﬁcation tests based on Sargan pseudo-F tests. *** 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level; # 15% level
2
7Table 4: Speciﬁcations with Liquidity Constraints: Split Samples
IV (1) (2) (3) (4)
C Un-C C Un-C C Un-C C Un-C
(Con − Growth)2 1.289 0.250 2.013 2.856 1.239 0.659 0.850 -0.252
(0.442)*** (1.411) (0.715)*** (2.372) (0.671)* (1.637) (0.458)* (1.391)
Implied 2.578 0.501 4.026 5.712 2.478 1.319 1,700 -0.505
Prudence (0.884)*** (2.823) (1.431)*** (4.744) (1.342)* (3.274) (0.917)* (2.782)
Income -1.106 -0.405 -0.956 -0.945 -1.097 -0.486 -1.026 -0.293
(0.495)** (0.447) (0.616)** (0.643)# (0.500)** (0.473) (0.484)** (0.438)
Over Ida 0.387 0.787 0.141 0.717
Standard errors in parentheses. C stands for Constrained households and Un-C for Un-constrained households. IV (1) includes education, occupation,
number of earners, and assets. IV (2) includes occupation, number of earners, and assets. IV (3) includes education, number of earners, and assets.
IV (4) includes education, occupation, and assets. Age dummies (not reported here) are included to control for life cycle eﬀects. a. represents the
over-identiﬁcation tests based on Sargan pseudo-F tests. *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level; # 15% level
2
8Table 5: Variables Identifying Constrained Households









Number of Earners 0.022 0.045
Number of Children -0.062 0.047
District Dummy 2 1.350 0.243***
District Dummy 3 0.969 0.186***
District Dummy 4 1.698 0.237***
Constant 1.162 0.998
S.E = Standard Error. a. Due to rounding. *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level; # 15%
level
29Table 6: Switching Regressions
IV (1) (2) (3) (4)
C Un-C C Un-C C Un-C C Un-C
(Con − Growth)2 0.935 0.471 1.649 1.199 0.893 0.428 0.768 0.302
(0.415)** (0.477) (0.620)*** (0.672)* (0.557)# (0.587) (0.417)* (0.478)
Implied 1.871 0.942 3.298 2.399 1.787 0.857 1.536 0.605
Prudence (0.830)** -0.954 (1.241)*** (1.345)* (1.115)# (1.175) (0.834)* (0.957)
Income -0.718 -0.143 -0.650 -0.100 -0.718 -0.143 -0.710 -0.140
(0.633) (0.508) (0.635) (0.510) (0.634) (0.509) (0.633) (0.508)
Smith & -0.058 -0.78 -0.015 0.112
Blundella (0.419) (0.624) (0.559) (0.420)
Sample Selection -0.066 -0.075 -0.066 -0.065
Correctionb (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087)
Standard errors are in parentheses. C stands for Constrained households and Un-C for Un-constrained households. IV (1) includes education,
occupation, number of earners, and assets. IV (2) includes occupation, number of earners, and assets. IV (3) includes education, number of earners,
and assets. IV (4) includes education, occupation, and assets. Age dummies (not reported here) are included to control for life cycle eﬀects. a.
represents the Smith & Blundell adjustment term and b. represents the sample selection correction term. *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level; #
15% level
3
0